

TeleTrust-EBCA "PKI-Workshop" 2025

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"Update S/MIME Certificate Working Group"

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S/MIME Certificate Working Group

S/MIME BR	Ballot	Subject
1.0.7	SMC09	Update to WebTrust requirements, require linting, minor edits
1.0.8	SMC010	Introduction of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC)
1.0.9	SMC011	Add EUID as Registration Reference
1.0.10	SMC012	ACME for S/MIME Automation
1.0.11	SMC013	Introduction of PQC Algorithms
1.0.12	SMC014	DNSSEC for S/MIME

Pre-issuance Linting

- Cleans out profile issues
- Required starting 20250915
- Open-source PKILINT has complete coverage of the S/MIME BR
 - <https://github.com/digicert/pkilint>

MPIC

- Multiple Perspective Issuance Corroboration
- Required when conducting Domain Control Validation (DCV) and Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) checks.
- Defense against network-level attacks like Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijacking.
- Quorum of agreement between Primary Network Perspective and Remote Perspectives.
 - Phased launch starting earlier this year
 - Enforcement starting 20250915

DNSSEC

- SMC014 = SC085
- DNSSEC adds an optional layer of security to DNS by enabling cryptographic validation of DNS resource records.
- CA required to validate DNSSEC, when present, in the course of retrieving CAA records or performing DCV-related DNS lookups from Primary Network Perspectives.
- Effective date of March 15, 2026
- Adoption rate of DNSSEC is fairly low today, but domains that do use DNSSEC will benefit from improved security.

Post Quantum

- Introduces specifications for the use of two PQC algorithms, as standardized by the U.S. NIST:
 - ML-DSA, a digital signature scheme; and
 - ML-KEM, a key encapsulation mechanism.
- Specifies single-key/non-hybrid PQC certificates that do not rely upon pre-quantum algorithms.
- Intended to enable experimentation by Certificate Issuers with PQC certificates.
- Additional requirements on the use of PQC may be imposed by Root programs.

S/MIME BR ongoing discussion

- Pseudonyms
 - Tagging when repeated in CN
 - Better handling of corporate “role names”
- Mobile Driver Licenses
- PQC updates (such as composite)

Server Certificate Working Group

TLS BR	Ballot	Subject
2.1.2	SC080	Strengthen WHOIS lookups and Sunset Methods 3.2.2.4.2 and 3.2.2.4.15
2.1.3	SC083	Winter 2024-2025 Cleanup Ballot
2.1.4	SC084	DNS Labeled with ACME Account ID Validation Method
2.1.5	SC081	Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods
2.1.6	SC085	Require Validation of DNSSEC (when present) for CAA and DCV Lookups
2.1.7	SC089	Mass Revocation Planning

DCV Methods

- Browser draft ballot to sunset “manual” methods
 - Methods relying on email and phone:
 - 3.2.2.4.4 (Constructed Email to Domain Contact)
 - 3.2.2.4.13 (Email to DNS CAA Contact)
 - 3.2.2.4.14 (Email to DNS TXT Contact)
 - 3.2.2.4.16 (Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact)
 - 3.2.2.4.17 (Phone Contact with DNS CAA Phone Contact)
 - 3.2.2.5.2 (Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to IP Address Contact)
 - 3.2.2.5.5 (Phone Contact with IP Address Contact)
 - Method that enables crossover attacks:
 - 3.2.2.4.8 (IP Address)
- Focus on automated methods

Shrinking Time

- Driving home automation

	Maximum Validity	DCV Reuse	Subject
Until March 15, 2026	398 days	398 days	825 days
As of March 15, 2026	200	200	398
As of March 15, 2027	100	100	398
As of March 15, 2029	47	10	398

Mass Revocation Plans

- Mozilla requirement, added to TLS BR
- Communicate revocation obligations to Subscribers
- Reinforce through legal agreements
- Planning for mass revocation
 - Testing
 - Under audit
- Emphasis on the use of automation, continuous improvement
 - Not just revoke: replace!



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- CA/Browser Forum TLS and S/MIME
- ETSI ESI
- C2PA